Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

4-1-1990

The Quality of Managers in Centralized versus Decentralized
Organizations
Raaj K. Sah
Joseph E. Stiglitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Sah, Raaj K. and Stiglitz, Joseph E., "The Quality of Managers in Centralized versus Decentralized
Organizations" (1990). Discussion Papers. 632.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/632

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH ~ENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut 06520

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 624

THE QUALITY OF MANAGERS IN CENTRALIZED
VERSUS DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATIONS

Raaj K. Sah
Yale University
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Stanford University

April 1990

Notes:

This paper is forthcoming in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to
stimulate discussion and critical comments.

THE QUALITY OF MANAGERS IN CENTRALIZED
VERSUS DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATIONS*
Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz
Revised:

ABSTRACT:
centralization

April 1990

This paper ·examines the dynamic consequences of a greater
or

decentralization

of

the

decision-making

authority

to

appoint successor managers on the quality of managers actually appointed.
Our main result is that a greater centralization results in a greater vari
ability over ti~e in the quality of managers.

An intuitive reason for this is

that though a highly capable manager may have large beneficial effects on the
managerial choices within a

centralized system,

because this manage:: has

greater authority in such a system, a highly incapable manager placed in the
same position has correspondingly large deleterious effects.

*We thank Roger G~esnerie, Jacques Cremer and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments and the National Science Foundation and the Olin Foundation for
support.

A central task of the leadership of any organization is the choice of
its successors

and subordinates.

part of their time

Corporate presidents spend a significant

selecting upper management.

Tenured faculty sometimes

spends months deciding whether particular individuals should be admitted into
their ranks.

The effort and contentio.usness which often goes into this pro-

cess suggests that it has important consequences for the organization.

It is

recognized that there are large differences in individuals' abilities and that
the abilities of those in leadership inevitably affect the performance and
survival of the organization.
Our objective here is to examine how the centralization or decentraliza
tion of decision-making authority affects the quality of the managers who are
actually selected.

This question is naturally dynamic because the quality of

current managers is not only influenced by that of past managers but it, in
turn, affects the quality of future managers.
We consider stylized economies consisting of an arbitrary number of hier
archies (organizations) of different sizes.
number of. managers w;ithin the hierarchy,
boss)

and others are subordinates.

The size of a hierarchy is the

one of whom is the hierarch (the

The current hierarch appoints his own

successor and those of his subordinates, but has no influence on any other
hierarchy.

(This

assumption exaggerates somewhat the typical asymmetry of

authority between the hierarch and the subordinates.)
"more" or "less" centralized economy is intuitive:

Our definition of a

an economy is more cen-

tralized if. it has a larger proportion of the total number of managers in
larger hierarchies.
Our main result is that there is a greater variability (ove-r time)
the steady-state quality of managers in a more centralized economy.

in

This is

because highly capable decision-makers have greater beneficial effects on the
managerial choices in a more centralized economy.

By the same token, highly

2

incapable managers placed in the
effects.

same positions have greater deleterious

The overall effect of a greater centralization, therefore, is to in

duce a greater variability in the economy's managerial quality.
A

natural next question is:

what is the relationship between the degree

of centralization and the economy's output? The answer depends on, among other
things, the nature of the relationship between managers' abilities and organi
zational output.

We have investigated in detail a simple case in which man

agers choose projects in addition to their successors and subordinates.
I.

MANAGERIAL QUALITY

There are two types of managers:

those with high and those with low

abilities to select managers; they are referred to as "good" and "bad" managers respectively.

If a high ability manager selects a future manager, he

(she)

will select a high ability manager with probability q , and a. low
1
ability manager with probability 1 - q . The corresponding probabilities for
1
a low ability manager are q

2

and 1 - q .
2

We assume that 1 > q

1 > q 2 > O; that

is, while neither type of manager is perfect, each type has some ability to
select high ability managers. 1
Let I\i(s) denote the number of hierarchies of size Min economy s, where
M ~ 1.

Let N(s) =

~

MI\i(s) denote the total number of managers in economy s.

M

Then, according to our definition, economy s' is more centralized than s, if
N(s)

N(s') = N, and if

for all J

~

1, and the strict inequality holds in (1) for at least one J.

That is, if the proportions of the total number of managers in an economy who
are in hierarchies of different sizes are viewed as a discrete probability
density function, then the economy s' is more centralized than s if this dens
ity function in s'

is a first-order stochastic improvement over that in s.

For later use, define the average size of a hierarchy in economy s as

3
(2)
.

h(s) =

~

M

2
M ~(s)/N

It is obvious then that the average size of a hierarchy is larger in a more
centralized economy.

That is,

h(s) < h(s') .

(3)

Now consider a hierarchy of size Min isolation from all other constitu
ents of the economy.
agers.

The random variable m denotes the number of good man-

Within the present hierarchy, m assumes values from O to M.

g(mlM) denote the steady-state density of min this hierarchy.

Let

Then,

2

(4)

g(mlM) =

~

zkb(m, M, qk)

where

k=l

successes out of M trials when qk is the probability of each success.
The derivation of (4) is highly intuitive.

The succession process de-

pends critically on the hierarch because the subordinates do not influence
it.

z

and z

1

2

is the (steady-state) probability that the hierarch is a good manager,
is the probability that the hierarch is a bad manager. 2

binomial density b(m, M,

Further, the

q ) is the probability that m good managers are
1

chosen when the hierarch is good, and b(m, M, q ) is the corresponding proba
2
bility when

the

hierarch

is

bad. . Straightforward combination of

these

probabilities yields (4).
Next, let A(M) and v(M) respectively denote the mean and the variance of
the number of good managers in a hierarchy of size M.

Then, (4), (5), and the

standard properties of the binomial variate yield
(6)

A(M) = Mz ,
1

and

v(M)

To analyze the economy s as a whole, let A(s) and V(s) respectively de-

4

note

the mean and

the variance

of the number of good managers

in this

economy. Since the mean or the variance of a sum of independent random var
iables is the sum of their respective means or variances, (2) and (6) yield
A(s) = Nzi_ , and

(7)

It follows that:

The number of good managers in a more centralized economy

has the same mean but a higher variance.
Expressions (2) and (7) yield an additional result.

Even when two econ

omies are not comparable, in the sense that one of them is more centralized
based on our definition, it is still the case that an economy with a larger
average size of a hierarchy has a larger variance in the number of good
managers.
Next, consider the distribution of good managers.

If ~<mis) denotes the

probability density associated with the state in which there are m good man
agers in economy s, then ~<mis) for various m's are obtained from the convo
lution of the densities given by (4).
2

(8)

~<Ols)

(9)

~<Nls) =TI{~ zkb(M, M, qk)}
M k=l

IT{ ~ zkb(O, M, qk)}
M k=l
2

For instance,
~(s)
, and

~(s)

denote the probabilities associated with the polar states where, respectively,
none of the managers is good, and none of the managers is bad.

It is easy to

verify that.a~(Ols)/8qk < 0, and a~(Nls)/8qk > 0, fork= 1· and 2.

That is:

If individual managers are more capable in choosing future managers, then the
probability that an economy has all high ability managers is higher, and the
probability that the economy has all low ability managers is lower.

This is

what one would expect.
A general comparison of ~<mis) and ~<mis') is difficult, given the corn-

5

plexity of expressions such as (8) and (9).

To obtain additional insights,

therefore, we compare two economies with two managers each.

The decentralized

economy, s, has two hierarchies, each of size one (that is, n (s) = 2, and
1
1\t(s) = 0 for M ~ 1). The centralized economy, s', has one hierarchy of two
managers (that _is, n (s') - 1, and 1\t(s') - 0 for M ,.s_2).
2

Values of the 1r's

can then be explicitly calculated, using expressions such as (8) and (9), as

(11)

1r(0ls') = (1 - q )[1
1
and 1r(2ls')

q (1 + Q)]/b, 1r(lls') - 2q (1 - q )(1 + Q)/b
2
2
1
q2(q2 + qlQ)/b ;

2

where a= (1

Q) , and b = 1 - Q.

(12)

}.:; {1r<ils')

}.:;

From (10) and (11),

j.sm isj

for all m, and the strict inequality holds for at least one m.
1r(mls') is a mean-preserving spread of 1r(mls).

Thus:

Equivalently,

A greater centraliza-

tion induces a mean-preserving spread in the number of good managers. 3

Finally,

consider

an

alternative

approach which

illustrates,

in the

simple case in which there are two managers in economy s as well as s'

'

our

earlier general result that the number of good managers has a higher variance
. a more centra 1·1ze d economy. 4
in

Denote the steady-state quality of the i-th

manager by the random variable X., where i - 1 and 2, and X. is 1 or 0 depend1
1

ing on whether the manager is good or bad.
Pr{Xi = 0} = z , as described in (5).
2

Then,

Pr{Xi = 1} = z

1

and

It is clear that these probabilities do

not depend ·on the economy to which the manager belongs.

Thus, the economy

does not affect the moments of X. (including its variance); it only affects
1
the correlation among these variables.
= Var(X ) + Var(X ) + 2Cov(X , x 1s).
1
2
1
2

established that

Note that V(s)

= Var(X

1

+ x 2 Is)

Now, it is apparent and can be easily

Cov(X , x Is) = 0, because the two managers are chosen by
1
2

two different hierarchs in economy s, and that Cov(X , x 1s') > 0, because the
1
2
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two managers are chosen by the same hierarch in economy s' .

Thus, V(s') >

V(s).
II.

MANAGERIAL OUTPUT

The relationship between the quality of managers and the output or the
performance o,f an organization is complicated.

It depends not only on the

distribution of ability and on the tasks -which managers perform, but also on
the positive· and_ negative externalities that good and bad managers exert on
one another.

In this section, we examine these aspects using the simple

model, described in a part of the last section, in which there are only two
managers in the decentralized as well as the centralized economy.
First consider the case where the expected output of both economies is
the same if they have the same number of good managers.

Then, from the ob

servation made earlier that the distribution of the number of good managers
in the centralized economy is a mean-preserving spread of the corresponding
distribution in the decentralized economy, it follows that:

The output in

the centralized economy is smaller than that in the decentralized economy if
the output is concave in the number of good managers.

The opposite is the

case if the output is convex in the number of good managers.
The relative performance of the centralized economy is further weakened
if the comparison is based not on the expected output but on the expected
utility of the output, and if the utility displays some risk aversion.

In

fact, even when output is convex in the number of good managers, if the util
ity is sufficiently concave in output, the expected utility will be higher in
the decentralized economy.
In the rest of this section, we analyze a specific example with explicit
managerial tasks.

Managers select projects .and future managers.

ity, we assume that there are only two types of projects:

For simplicgood projects,

yielding an (expected net) profit x; and bad projects, yielding a profit -x.

7

Half the projects are good, haif are bad.
have any discriminating ability;
projects.

Bad managers are assumed not to

they randomly accept a fraction p

of the

2

Good managers are better at choosing future managers as well as

they accept a good project with probability p 1 and a bad project
1
2
2
. h pro b a b·1·
h
.
.
h
wit
i ity p , were
p l > p > p . Th e f raction
o f proJects
tat
a goo d
1
1
1
2
projects;

manager accepts is p

1

= (p

1
1

2
+ P1 )/2.

In economy s' , a project is accepted only if both managers accept it.
In contrast, in economy s, a project is accepted if either of the two inde
pendent managers accept it.

Thus, the 'decentralized' economy is more decen-

tralized in the selection of successors as well as proJ. ects. 5
denote the profit of economy s if there are m good managers.
(13)

Y(Ols) = 0 , Y(lls) = 1 - p

(14)

Y(Ols') = 0 , Y(lls') = p
The

ste'ady

state

profit

2

of

2

Let Y(ml s)

Then,

6

, and Y(2ls) = 2(1 - p )
1

, and Y(2ls') = 2p
economy

s

is

1

.
Y(s) = ~ 1r(ml s)Y(ml s).
m

l::,Y = Y(s)

Y(s') is the difference between the profits of the two economies.

Then, (10), (11), (13) and (14) yield
(15)

~y = 21r(2ls)(l - 2p ) + 1r(lls)(l - 2p ) - 26(p - p ) ,
1
2
1
1

where
of managers accept the

Now consider the case where both types
same fraction of projects

(that

is,

p

1

= p

2

= p).

Then, the screening of projects by managers is "tight" or "slack" depending on
whether pis smaller or larger than one-half.

It follows from (15) that:

If

the fraction of projects approved by good and bad managers is the same, then
the profit of the decentralized economy is larger than that of the centralized
economy, if the screening of projects by managers is tight, while it is small
er, if the screening of projects by managers is slack.

University of Chicago and Yale University
Stanford University
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NOTES
1. We treat q's as exogenous parameters.

In another context (namely,

the effect of homogeneous individuals' fallibility concerning project choice
on organizational performance),
Sah and Stiglitz [1986a].

analogous probabilities are endogenized in

The role of fallibility under alternative organiza

tional forms such as committees, hierarchies and polyarchies is analyzed in
Sah and Stiglitz [1988].

See Sah [1990] for an overview.

2. In the steady-state, z

1

- z q + z q , because q is the probability
1 1
2 2
1

of selecting a good manager as the next period's hierarch if the current
hierarch is good, whereas q
hierarch is bad.

Using z

3. This result,
the system.

2

2

is the corresponding probability if the current

= 1 - z , the preceding expression yields (5).
1

(12), is likely to hold regardless of the size, N, of

Partial support for this conjecture comes from (8) and (9) which

yield (see an earlier version of the present paper [1986b]) that:

> 1r(mls), form= 0 and N.

That is:

1r(mls')

The probability that all managers are

good, or that all managers are bad, is higher in a more centralized economy.
4. This approach was suggested by a referee.
5.

We

have

asstLTied

here

that

the

centralization

of

decision~making

authority in one dimension is correlated with that in another dimension.
6.

In

the

Pi) /2,

expressions

for

the

Y's,

we

suppress

a

where T is the number of availabl~ projects.

constant,
It is assumed

that, in economy .s, half of the projects initially go to each of the two man
agers, that those rejected by one manager go to the other, and that the same
project is not reviewed more than once by each manager.

Thus, for example,

when econom~ s has two good·managers, the acceptance probabilities for a good
project and a bad project are respectively p 1 (2
1

profit is Y(2ls) = Tx[pi(2
(13).

2

The

pl)]/2, which is reexpressed as in

